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Abstract. In order to analyze the impact of the new banking capital regulation (Basel II)
on the business cycle in an emerging economy, I develop a duopoly model composed of
domestic and foreign banks. The principal results are: by the conduct of new banking
capital regulation, the assessment of credit risk carried out by an international bank in a
given country not only affects the total loans in that country but also the total assets
supplied in other countries. Second, analyzing risk-averse banks, as portfolio diversifica-
tion increases, the change in loans allocated in a given country by an international bank as
a proportion of the original investment and the total level of loans for that country can be
harshly affected by the behavior of a foreign bank following only “news” through the new
capital regulation. Finally, even in the case that portfolio diversification increases without
limits, the macroeconomic implication of a change of credit risk estimation, via the new
capital regulation, is larger when banks are risk-neutral than risk-averse.
JEL classification: D43, E51, G11, G28.
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Resumen. Con el propósito de analizar el impacto de la nueva regulación de capital de
bancos (Basilea II) sobre el ciclo económico de una economía emergente, desarrollo
un modelo de duopolio compuesto por bancos locales y extranjeros. Los principales
resultados son: por medio de la nueva regulación de capital, la evaluación del riesgo
crediticio realizada por un banco internacional en un país, no sólo afecta a los préstamos
totales de ese país sino también a los  activos totales otorgados en otros países. Segundo,
cuando los bancos son aversos al riesgo y a medida que la diversificación del portafolio
aumenta, el cambio en los préstamos concedidos en un país por un banco internacional
como proporción de la inversión inicial, así como el nivel de los prestamos totales de
ese país, pueden resultar fuertemente afectados por el comportamiento de un banco
que sigue sólo “noticias” a través de la nueva regulación de capital. Finalmente, incluso
cuando la diversificación del portafolio crece sin límite, la implicación macroeconómica
de un cambio en la estimación del riesgo crediticio debida a la nueva regulación de
capital, aumenta a medida que los bancos son menos aversos al riesgo.
Clasificación JEL: D43, E51, G11, G28.
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1. Introduction
The most important justification that is often presented for regulating banks is the
threat of a systemic risk due to a bank run and the inability of depositors to monitor
banks. With the purpose to ensure a secure banking system for depositors and to
encourage banks to invest in healthy projects, there are a number of specific instruments
to regulate the banking industry.
One of the most predominant and employed instruments in the regulation of banking
is the deposit insurance contract offered by the government. There exists a vast literature
about the determination of the price. Starting with Merton (1977), he shows that deposit
insurance can be viewed as a put option with a strike price equal to the promised maturity
value of its debt. However, the arbitrage pricing method assumes that, among other
things, financial markets are complete and the provider of deposit insurance can value
accurately bank’s assets because he has perfect information about the risk of banks’
assets (and then moral hazard is ruled out). Under these conditions, however, deposit
insurance is not necessary because there is no risk of bank panics. To that extent research
was developed to specifically address the issue of the feasibility of fairly priced deposit
insurance with the existence of asymmetry information. Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor
(1992), for example, consider a setting where there is asymmetry of information and
the insurance provider offers a menu of contracts, each requiring the bank to hold a
certain capital–to–assets ratio and charging it a given insurance premium per unit of
deposits. The authors find that it is generally impossible to implement incentive-com-
patible fairly priced deposit insurance. The reason is that the high–risk institution always
prefers the menu of contracts chosen by the low–risk institution as long as this one
chooses some positive level of deposits. Freixas and Rochet (1995) consider also the
issue of incentive-compatible fair pricing of deposit insurance. They show that fair
pricing is feasible but is not desirable from a welfare point of view. The reason is that it
entails a subsidization of the less efficient banks by the more efficient ones. This cross-
subsidization prevents the less efficient banks from mimicking the more efficient ones,
thus improving the allocation of deposits, but there is a distortion because it leads to
inefficient entry and exit decisions.
When the insurance provider observes bank risks only with error, risk-based
premiums mechanisms are no longer equivalent (Flannery (1991)). It is then
advantageous to consider jointly the design of deposit insurance and capital requirements
to ensure that the government’s option is “out of the money”. More precisely,
Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington (1993) consider this issue in a model where the
banker knows the quality of the loans but the regulator does not, and the banker can
influence that quality through an unobservable effort choice. The regulator provides a
deposit insurance maximizing social welfare, which it is defined by the difference of
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bank’s profit and government’s cost. For that, the regulator has to manage between the
social costs from default and of avoiding default. By using a capital requirement policy,
the government can observe the realized total quality of the loan portfolio (by periodic
inspection of banks assets) and then motivate banks to improve their portfolios. Under
the socially optimal deposit insurance system, the insurance premium needs to be
adjusted for the quality of the bank’s portfolio of loans, and higher-quality banks are
allowed a relatively larger asset base and face lower capital requirements. Because in
this model, banks are risk-neutral, the deposit insurance contract produce that banks
behave as risk lovers (taking mean preserving spread in the projects) and then it is
necessary the presence of capital requirements. Additionally, Bensaid, Pagès and Rochet
(1993) consider both the presence of an adverse selection and moral hazard problem
and found that optimal regulation can be decentralized by offering banks a menu of
solvency and quality requirements. Solvency requirements are risk-adjusted and quality
requirements are defined in terms of interim information, measured for instance by
ratings performed by independent agencies.
Freixas and Gabillon (1998) consider again banks with private information on the
initial value of their portfolio of loans, but this value follows Merton formula for pricing
the deposit insurance premium. Using this framework, they characterize the optimal
mechanism that maximizes the social surplus, constraining to be incentive compatible
and individual rational. They obtain that if loans have a positive net present value,
banks will never hold reserves (risk-free assets), and the deposit insurance premium
will have to be decreasing with the bank’s capital. In general, in these models based in
imperfect information, there exists a trade-off between capital standards and insurance
premium in order to extract information and minimize the cost of inducing the low-
quality banks to mimic the high-quality ones.
When banks are regulated by a flat-capital requirement, this may lead to an increase
in the bank’s probability of failure because the banker may choose to compensate the
loss in utility from the reduction in leverage with the choice of a riskier portfolio.
Regulators can eliminate this adverse effect by using a risk–based capital requirement
approach (Kim and Santomero (1988)). But this conclusion can be questioned. Rochet
(1992) studies the case in which banks are protected by limited liability and then the
objective function becomes the difference between the expected utility under no-
bankruptcy and the expected bankruptcy cost. If the bank is undercapitalized (i.e. having
a capital below the inverse of the absolute risk aversion index), the convexity of
preferences due to limited liability may dominate risk aversion, and the bank will behave
as a risk lover. In this case, even a risk–based capital regulation that makes use of
market–based risk weights may not be enough to restrain the bank’s appetite for risk. It
may be necessary to impose an additional regulation, for example, to require banks to
operate with a minimum capital level. In that context, the operational risk established
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in the New Basel Capital Regulation (known as Basel II) can be considered as an
additional capital required that accomplishes this function.1
Another common rationale for banking regulation builds on the problems of corporate
governance (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993a, 1993b). Because depositors that hold bank
debt are not in a position to monitor management, as they are small and uninformed,
they need to be represented by a regulator. Capital standards may be an important
instrument to implement the optimal governance of banks because they can be used to
define the threshold for the transfer of control from shareholders to the regulator.2
The review of contemporary banking theory has illustrated that there are differences
in opinion regarding the market failures that justify banking regulation as well as in the
conclusions of the research on the optimal design of capital regulation. Despite the progress
in the theory of banking in the last two decades, there are still many relevant questions
that remain unanswered. For example, as noted by Santos (2000), theoretical research on
the macroeconomic implications of bank capital regulation is still limited (Blum and
Hellwig (1995), Thakor (1996), and Krainer (2002)). The present article discusses the
role of banking capital regulation in this context, analyzing in particular the behavior of
foreign banks in emerging economies.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section two analyzes the
research that has been done on the relationship between banking capital regulation and
the business cycle. Section three presents the different channels of the procyclicality of
the financial system, and evaluates both capital accords, Basel I and II. Section four
analyzes procyclicality in emerging financial markets, with emphasis in Latin Ameri-
can countries. Section five develops a duopoly model composed of a domestic and an
international bank, in order to study the implications of Basel II in emerging markets,
first under the assumption that they are risk-neutral and second that they are risk-averse.
Section six concludes and presents the main results of the model.
2. Banking a Theory of the Business Cycle
Blum and Hellwig (1995) have studied the macroeconomic implications of The Basel
Accord of 1988, known also as Basel I;3  more precisely, they studied the impact of a
variation in the bank equity on bank lending and industry investment. They found that,
given a binding capital adequacy requirement, an additional unit of bank profits induces an
increase of more than one unit of bank lending, showing that the multiplier effect of bank
profits on investment demand is higher with a binding capital adequacy requirement than
 1 See footnote 6 for an overview of this accord.
2 See Part IV of Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (2004) for a more detailed review of the regulation
of financial intermediaries.
3 See annex 1 for an overview of this accord.
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without one. Thakor (1996) investigated the impact of “risk-based” capital requirement on
aggregate bank lending. In particular, he showed that because an increase in the risk-based
capital requirement increases a bank’s loan-funding cost (competition limits the bank’s
ability to pass this cost along to borrowers), therefore a small rise in the risk-based capital
requirement for banks elevates the endogenously determined probability that a borrower
will be denied credit by the entire banking system, thus reducing aggregate lending.
More recently, Krainer (2002) presents a partial equilibrium model of portfolio
decisions of non-financial and financial enterprises. This model analyzes an agency
problem between relatively more risk-averse bondholders and relatively less risk-averse
stockholders. In the case of a non-financial enterprise, the solution of this problem
takes the form of a “shared decision-making authority specified in an up-front contract”.
In the case of financial enterprises, the Basel Accord of 1988 was analyzed to question
whether or not it is a particular application of this contract.
Can Basel I be a countercyclical contract? When banks shift the composition of
their portfolio from safe assets4  (e.g., categories 1 and 2 assets) into more risky assets
(e.g., categories 3 and 4 assets) as they do in periods of general economic expansion,
they are required by the Basel Accord to increase their tier capital thereby reducing
their financial leverage. Similarly when they shift from risky assets into more safe
assets (the so-called flight to quality) as they do in recessions, they are allowed to
reduce their capital thereby increasing their financial leverage.
However, Krainer (2002) notes that the four categories are based on the legal
classification of the financial asset.5  Thus, a shock-induced reduction in the risk aversion
of bank shareholders that raises bank stock valuations in the stock market is the signal for
these intermediaries to put riskier investments in their portfolios. Part of this portfolio
adjustment takes the form of risk deepening within category 4 assets, and no new capital
is required. For this reason, the capital cushion or the “counter-cyclical capital” as computed
now would at some times be inadequate. Concerning the New Basel Capital Accord
(Basel II),6  for the author it is doubtful that it can prevent capital arbitrage. Indeed, others
studies have shown7  that it is possible for a bank to reduce its regulatory capital
requirements while at the same time increasing the standard deviation of its portfolio.
4 See annex 1 for a best comprehension of this point.
5 Indeed, no distinction is made between investment grade business loans and low grade debt.
6 In 1999 the Basel Committee proposed a revised capital adequacy standard to replace the 1988
Accord. Two important aspects are considered in this new accord. First, it develops more risk-sensitive
methodologies in calculating the regulatory capital. Indeed, in contrast to the present accord, credit risk
measurement is taking into account and operational risk is included. Second, to contribute to a higher level
of safety and soundness in the financial system, two aspects have been added to the minimum capital
requirements. Indeed, the New Accord consists of three pillars, minimum capital requirements, supervisory
review of capital adequacy and market discipline. However, in spite of the importance of the two last pillars,
the new accord has been concentrated largely in the first one. This accord is supposed to start in 2006.
7 See Alexander, G., and Baptista, A. (2001).
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3. Procyclicality of the Financial System: from Based I to Basel II
3.1. An analysis of the numerator of the solvency ratio: provisions and capital
First, it is important to make the distinction between expected and unexpected losses.
The expected losses refer to the average or mean losses anticipated over a particular
period, while unexpected losses refer to a measure of the dispersion, or degree of
uncertainty that surrounds that outcome. The second notion of risk is closer in spirit to
classical definitions of risk and it is related to the concept of diversification. Graphically,
it is easy to understand the difference between these two concepts.
Figure 1. Expected Losses and Unexpected Losses
It is widely accepted that the role of capital is to provide protection against unexpected
losses and of the role of provisions is to provide cover against expected losses. This
distinction is important for at least two reasons. The first is that having provisions
against expected losses (properly measured) is likely to reduce fluctuations in recorded
bank profitability at business cycle frequencies. The second is that because the balance
sheet must represent the true value of both gross and net assets of the bank, then gross
assets values need to be recorded net of expected losses.
Concerning capital regulation, the 1988 Capital Accord established that difference
between capital and provisions, although provisions are included in the capital. Moreover,
in a large part of the countries in the world, the regulatory system distinguishes between
specific and general provisions. With respect to Basel II, in the January 2001 proposal,
regulatory capital charges have been calibrated to cover both expected and unexpected
losses (with the expected losses defined as the probability of default over the next year
multiplied by the losses in the event of default). In contrast, in January 2004, the Basel
 Probability
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Committee announced its intention to move to an Unexpected Losses (UL)-only risk
weighting construct. In summary, for the internal approach, expected losses will be
removed from the risk weight functions. However, banks will be required to compare
their actual provisions with expected losses. Any shortfall should be deducted equally
from Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital and any excess will be eligible for inclusion in Tier 2
capital subject to a cap. Therefore, the current treatment of general provisions will be
withdrawn from the internal approach. Concerning the standardized approach, the
Committee is not intending to make any related changes.8
The final expression of the capital ratio would then become in the New Basel Capi-
tal Accord as:
Tier I + Tier II (without GP) + GP for Std part + (-) excess (shortfall) for IRB part 8%
Credit RWA for Std part + Credit RWA for IRB part + Market RWA + Operational RWA
≥
where,
GP: General Provisions
RWA: Risk Weighted Assets
IRB: Internal Rating Based Approaches
From an analytical point view, as it is noted by Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001), the
need to create provisions arises because the loans are not recorded at market value. A
current value of a loan can be thought of as being equal to the present value of the
expected future cash flows generated by the loan. Moreover, these expected cash flows
are given by the contracted interest and principal payments on the loan less the expected
value of losses. Then the current value of a loan will equal its face value plus the
present value of expected default premiums minus the present value of the expected
losses. Defining the provisions as the difference between face and current values of a
loan, then provisions are the difference between the present value of expected losses
and the present value of expected default premiums, that is:
Provisions 
( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )
T T
i i
t t T i T i
i t i t
E l E dF V
r r− −
= =
= − = −
+ +
∑ ∑ (1)
where F is the face value, V is the current value of a loan, r is the discount rate, d is the
default premium and E(l) is the expected loss from non-repayment.
8 Concerning credit risk measurement, the Committee proposes a two-layer system. The first,
named the standardized approach, establishes fixed risk weights corresponding to each supervisory
category and makes use of external credit assessments provided by rating agencies. The second is an
approach where the risk weights would be based on the bank’s internal model of risk assessment. This
internal approach has two variants, a “foundation” and an “advanced” approach. The first approach is
for banks that are available to measure the probability of default. However, estimates of additional risk
factors, such as loss incurred by the bank given a default and the expected exposure at default, will be
derived through the application of standardized supervisory estimates. In contrast, the “advanced”
approach will be available for banking organizations that all the risk components mentioned above will
be estimated internally by the bank.
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Two important points follow from this formulation. The first is that the entire
future profile of expected losses and default premiums is relevant, not just the outcomes
over the next year. The second is that if the default premium adequately compensates
the bank for the expected non-repayment of principal and interest there is no need to
make a provision.
It is sometimes claimed that a provision should be created even in cases in which
overall expected losses are zero. Then, when the deterioration eventually occurs,
and defaults increase, the provisions built up in good times are drawn down, so that
profits are not adversely. The end result is stability in bank profits despite the cycle
in defaults.
Concerning the capital, unlike provisions, the relevant time horizon is not the entire
life of the loan, but rather depends upon the time taken for a bank to raise additional
capital or to remove risks from its balance sheet. Furthermore, the amount of capital
depends on the variability of expected cash flows over the chosen horizon. This
variability would depend on the correlation between exposures.9
An alternative approach of capital would be for regulators to set the minimum level
of bank capital with the explicit goal not of protecting depositors, but of protecting the
stability of the financial system as a whole. If institutions were large and/or correlations
high, a much higher level of capital would be required.
There are two distinct reasons why capital should change over time. The first is
to reflect the changing riskiness of the relevant portfolio to maintain constant the
target probability of failure. The second relates to reduce the costs of raising capi-
tal under different conditions and hence its impact on financial distress. Both of
these arguments suggest that capital should be raised in booms. From the perspective
of the system as a whole, raising capital in good times to be drawn upon in bad
times has the additional benefit of limiting the amplification of the financial and
business cycle.
3.2. Procyclicality of provisions and capital
Taking some OECD’s countries during the period 1980-2000, Borio et al. (2001) show
that bank provisions are strongly procyclical, being highly negatively correlated with the
business cycle. In large part, the behavior of provisions translates into a clear procyclical
pattern in bank profitability, which further encourages procyclical lending practices. This
pattern appears to be strongest in those countries that experienced banking system problems
9 Unfortunately, the New Basel Capital Accord does not take into account a good measure of
correlation between exposures.
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in the 1990s. For instance, for the case of Spain there is a strong correlation (0.84) between
profitability and GDP that confirms the necessity of a counter cyclical provisions policy.10
On the other hand, there does not appear a robust relationship between measured
capital ratios and the business cycle. Additionally, the task of detecting any relationship
is made difficult by the introduction of the Capital Accord in 1988, which has caused a
structural change in capital ratios. Further, the cycle in the ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets was much more pronounced than the cycle in the ratio of capital to
total assets. This reflects the fact that, in the aftermath of the banking crises, risk-
weighted assets fell more strongly than total assets, as banks shifted their portfolios
away from commercial lending towards public sector securities.
3.3. Credit risk and procyclicality
A first explanation for the procyclicality of the financial system has its roots in
information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. When economic conditions
are depressed and collateral values are low, information asymmetries can mean that
even borrowers with profitable projects find it difficult to obtain funding. The reverse
is also present. This explanation of economic and financial cycles is often known as the
“financial accelerator”.
However, as noted by Borio et al. (2001), while the financial accelerator probably
plays a role in all business cycles, it is not sufficient to generate the spread of financial
instability. They argue that an additional material source of financial procyclicality is
the difficulty in measuring the time dimension of risk. The measurement difficulties
often lead to risk being underestimated during booms and overestimated during
recessions. These measurement biases can arise from a variety of sources. One such
10 A third category of provisions has been created in Spain, the so-called statistical provision.
There are two approaches to comply with this provision. First, banks can use their own internal
models in order to determine the statistical provision. Alternatively, there is a standard approach
based on a set of coefficients, noted s, established by the regulator. Each coefficient corresponds to
a different level of credit risk in the portfolio and reflects the average net specific provision over the
economic cycle. Taking the latent risk measure ( LR s L= ⋅ ) as a percentage of loans, the annual
statistical provision is StP = Lr - SP  with SP being the specific provision.
If SP < Lr : low problem loans => StP > 0 : building up of the statistical fund.
If SP > Lr : high problem loans => StP < 0 : depletion of the statistical fund.
Then, the statistical provision was designed not to substitute but to complement the specific provision
(see Fernández de Lis, Martínez and Saurina, 1999). Hence it has a counterbalancing effect on the strong
cyclical behavior of loan loss provisions. Unfortunately, as noted by Borio et al (2001), this profit stabilizing
mechanism is, however, limited. If loan defaults are high and unusually large specific provisions are re-
quired, the statistical fund could be exhausted, and specific provisions would need to be made directly from
the current year’s profit. Conversely, once the statistical provision fund has reached three times the annual
charge, no further charges to profit are required.
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source is the complexity in forecasting overall economic activity and its link with credit
losses. This contributes to excessively short horizons and to an unwarranted extrapolation
of current conditions into the future.
More direct evidence of this idea can be obtained from the evolution of credit risk
assessments in both approaches of the New Basel Capital Accord.
Analyzing the standardized approach, the evidence suggests that credit rating agen-
cies fail to predict changes in the probability of crises, with downgrades occurring
during a crisis rather than before.11  The impact of external ratings migration on capital
requirements has also received some attention recently. For example in the case of the
United States there is very little cyclical impact of the Standardized approach relative
to the existing capital regime. A possible explanation of this small impact is that rating
agencies are some stable over time compared to other credit risk indicators such as
spreads on bonds.
Concerning the internal approach of Basel II, banks use a one-year horizon for
measuring the probability of default (PD). As it is noted by Borio et al (2001), the
nature of internal rating systems means that the average rating of a bank’s loan portfolio
is likely to change over the course of the business cycle. When economic conditions are
strong, loans are likely to move up the rating scale (to lower-risk ratings) given that the
PD in the next year is relatively low. Conversely, in an economic downturn the average
rating is likely to decline, given the increased PD in the short run. As a result, measured
risk, as revealed by average internal ratings, is likely to be negatively correlated with
the economic cycle.
The figure 2 shows the relationship between PD and the risk weight for loans to
corporate borrowers (in the internal and standard approach). It illustrates the Foundation
Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach as indicated in the Basel Committee’s April
2003 proposal. The use of internal ratings makes capital requirement considerably more
sensitive to the rating of the borrower than in the case under the Standardized approach.
This degree of sensitivity is however lower under the modified IRB proposals than it
was under the original proposal.12
An important consideration to evaluate the possible consequences of the new
regulatory framework for the procyclicality of capital requirements in both industrialized
and emerging market countries is the way that banks assign grades to individual
borrowers. Unfortunately, many banks have only developed comprehensive ratings
systems over recent years and the data are generally not available for research. One
exception to this is the data provided by a large Swedish bank to the Swedish Central
11 Moreover, Ferri, Liu and Manjnoni (2001) show that, compared to developed countries,
there exists a lack of accuracy in credit risk assessment for emerging countries.
12 See Lowe and Segoviano (2002) for a comparison between the IRB approach of January 2001 and
the modification realized in November 2001.
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Bank. These data include the ratings of over 50.000 borrowers over the period from
1994 to 2000 and show a significant amount of loan migration (see Carling et al, 2002).
In particular, during the mid-1990s when the Swedish economy was recovering from
recession, many loans were rerated to lower risk rating classes. Carling et al (2002)
estimate that for this bank the required capital ratio under the Foundation IRB approach
would have fallen from somewhere around 20% in 1994 to around 1-2% in 1999!.
The internal approach could be then more exposed to the possibility of procyclical
risk assessments than the standard approach which is based in external ratings. The
reason is that, in addition to the two aspects studied before,13 the capital charge depends
not only on the probability of default, but also on the loss given default.14  If in periods
of strong economic growth, collateral values become inflated, required capital may
fall, when in fact the reverse should be the case.
Finally, an important remark is that the denominator of the solvency ratio established
in the 1988 Capital Accord does not have a strong cyclical component. Indeed, capital
requirements change over time only if the structure of a bank’s assets changes. In contrast,
the New Basel Capital Accord implies that capital requirement for a given portfolio
will change over time as bank’s assessment of the riskiness of that portfolio changes.
Figure 2. Risk weights and grades
13 First, external ratings are more stable over time than bank internal ratings, and second the
use of the internal approach makes capital requirement more sensitive to the rating of the borrower
than the standardized approach.
14 In the last version of the New Basel Capital Accord, the loss given default (LGD) is fixed at 45%
instead of 50% for unsecured loans in the Foundation IRB approach, while in the Advanced IRB approach
banks are permitted to estimate the LGD for each loan. Moreover, the risk weight formula assumes that the
PD and the LGD are independent.
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4. An empirical analysis of emerging markets: the Latin American countries
In this section I analyze the relationship between capital regulation and procyclicality
for emerging economies. This is important for two reasons. First, risk-based capital
requirements are likely to be procyclical. In particular, while this concern is generally
expressed with reference to the wealthiest countries, perhaps it is even more relevant to
emerging market economies, where assessments of risk can change quickly and by a
significant degree. Second, even if in the beginning only developed countries will adopt
Basel II (i.e., the members of the Basel Committee), this does not mean that emerging
markets will not be affected. In fact, most of the questions for future research concern
the impact of this accord on developing countries. For instance, how will Basel II
impact banks domiciled and/or operating in emerging markets? How do the impacts
differ between standardized and internal approaches in emerging markets? And, can
the new banking capital regulation amplify the business cycle in emerging markets?
The purpose of this section is to study the variation in the required minimum level of
capital we might see in the Latin American economies following the implementation
of Basel II. For that, I present Lowe and Segoviano (2002) and Powell (2004). The
objective of Lowe et al. (2002) is to calculate how the average risk weight would have
moved in Mexico over the second half of the 1990s under both the standardized approach
and the foundation IRB approach. Central to this exercise is the calculation of annual
transition matrices. These matrices tell us the likelihood of a borrower having a specific
rating in one year’s time, conditional on its current rating. From these transition matri-
ces they obtain default frequencies for each grade. They interpret these frequencies as
the ex ante probabilities of default (PDs).
To calculate the amount of capital required under the standardized approach they
assume that all loans had an external rating, by mapping the calculated ex ante PDs into
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) ratings.
Analyzing capital requirements under the internal approach, the authors found
that they peak in December 1996 (more than 16%!) and then they subsequently decli-
ne, so that by December 1999 the capital requirements have returned to the levels
broadly consistent with those in March 1995 (close to 10%).
Capital requirements under the IRB approach are volatile. Regulatory capital
requirements are clearly larger during the period of highest loan defaults and when
economic conditions are most depressed, although the requirements increase only
gradually after the devaluation rather than in one large step. As Borio et al. (2001)
show, the standardized approach with pseudo-risk-weighting produces capital
requirements that are lower and less cyclically sensitive than those under the IRB
approach. However this result must be viewed with prudence because, first, few corporate
borrowers in Mexico have external ratings, and second, it is inappropriate to compare
ex-ante PD with PD observed by S&P for purposes of calculating the capital requirement
under the standard approach.
3. Sebastián Nieto.p65 19/05/05, 10:46 a.m.70
SEBASTIÁN NIETO PARRA 71
Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogotá (Colombia) 8 (1): 59-83, junio de 2005
While the extreme nature of the Mexican crisis provides perhaps an upper bound on
the likely increase in capital requirements in a downturn, a much smaller increase could
conceivably cause stress and a reduction in credit supply. As noted by the authors,
one way of avoiding such problems is for banks to hold adequate buffers above the
regulatory minimum in good times, so that deterioration in the economy does not
mean that new capital has to be raised. For that, banks need to take a multi-year view
when deciding capital levels, and integrate macroeconomic considerations into their
risk assessments. Supervisors can play a role here, by requiring banks to undertake
sensitivity stress tests to see how their regulatory capital ratios might move with
changes in economic conditions.
More recently, Powell (2004) studied the possible implications of Basel II in Latin
America. Assuming perfect competition between banks, he establishes for a group of
Latin American countries15  whether capital requirements (Basel I and Basel II) are binding
for banks. His principal findings are that countries with an “investment grade” rating, as
with Chile and Mexico, the capital requirement under the internal approach is smaller
than under the standard approach, and it is not binding. By contrast, in countries with a
poor rating (Venezuela and Ecuador), the capital requirement under the internal approach
is higher than under the standard, and Basel II is binding. Despite its useful results for
policy-makers, the study has several limitations. First, it quantifies capital requirements
in a fixed period of time (only for 2003) without taking into account the entire business
cycle. Second, the empirical analysis assumes that bank loans are only designated for
the sovereign. Third, the economic capital or endogenous capital is determined on the
assumption that banks are risk-neutral and that Latin American banking systems are perfect.
5. The model
In this section, I develop an imperfect competition model composed of two banks,
a domestic bank that continues to employ Basel I to determine capital requirements and
an international bank that implements Basel II. I use a Monti-Klein model16  adapted
for banking capital regulation, first with the assumption that banks are risk-neutral and
second that they are risk-averse. Because I consider only the impact of banking capital
regulation through credit-risk measurement at the level of loans, I simplify this regulation
by leaving market risk and operational risk out of account.
5.1. Risk-neutral banks
The balance sheet of each bank is composed only of loans L on the asset side and of
capital K and deposits D on the liability side. Indeed, the model assumes that there are
15 Argentina (before 2001 crisis), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru and
Venezuela.
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no open positions between international and domestic banks in the interbank market.
For simplicity I also assume the same constant marginal costs c for deposits and loans.
By contrast with the standard Monti-Klein model, there is no remuneration for deposits.
This assumption can be justified by the fact that I am interested in the effect of capital
regulation on the supply of loans, and minimum capital requirements do not depend on
the level of deposits.17  Consequently, the profit function is written as follows:
( , , ) ( ) ( )L KL D K r L L r K c D Lπ = − − + (2)
where, ( )Lr L  is the inverse demand function for loans and Kr  is the capital
remuneration determined exogenously by the equilibrium in the capital markets.
By matching assets and liabilities in the balance sheet: L K D= + (3)
I obtain that:  ( , ) ( ) (2 )L KL K r L L r K c L Kπ = − − − (4)
Denoting the capital requirement per unit of loans by β, capital regulation under
Basel I requires that:
K Lβ≥ ⋅  where β is a fixed percentage determined by the regulator. (5)
In order to determine whether the capital requirement is binding, the value of loans
L must be calculated as follows:
min , max ( , )
L
KL L Kπβ
 
=    (6)
Substituting the capital regulation structure (eq. (5)) into equation (4) and assuming
that all capital is needed to cover unexpected losses ( K Lβ= ),18  the bank’s profit function
becomes:
( ) ( ) (2 )L KL r L L r L cLπ β β= − − − (7)
From now on, I assume linearity in the demand function for loans which I write as:
( ) ( ) ( )d f d fL i L i i i ir L r L L a b L L= + = − + (8)
where diL  are the loans supplied by the domestic bank d and 
f
iL  are the loans supplied
by the foreign bank f in country i.19
Combining equations (7) and (8), I obtain in the case of the domestic bank that:
( , ) ( ) (2 )d d f d f d d di i i i i K i i d i iL L a b L L L r L c Lπ β β = − + − − −  (9)
16 See chapter 3 of Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a detailed review of this model.
17 Alternatively, the marginal cost can be viewed as the remuneration of deposits.
18 It is important to note that in some Latin American countries, national banking capital regulation
is stricter than Basel I, where the solvency ratio must be at least equal to 8%. For example, in Venezuela,
Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Colombia the capital requirements are respectively 12%, 11.5%, 11%, 9% and
9% instead of 8%. See IADB (2004).
19 Using equation (6) and assuming linearity in the demand function for loans, the problem to deter-
mine whether the capital requirement for the domestic bank is binding can be written as :
2min ,
2 2
f
d i
i
i
LK a cL
bβ
 
−
= −    and at equilibrium: 
2min ,
3
d
i
i
K a cL
bβ
 
−
=    .
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In order to determine the optimal amount of loans maximizing benefits for the domestic
bank, when capital regulation is binding, I compute the first order conditions (assuming
that π is concave) thus:
( , ) ( ) 2
0 ( )
2 2
d d f d f
d d fi i i K d d i
i i id
i
L L a r c c LL R L
L b
π β∂ − − −
= ↔ = = −∂ (10)
This expression can be interpreted as the reaction or best response function of bank
d to the loans supplied by bank f.
• Foreign Bank invests only in one emerging country
I start with the simplest case in which the foreign bank only invests in country i. As
we have seen before, in the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), β depends on the
credit risk estimation of assets calculated by banks or external agencies. Because this
estimation depends on the accuracy of the credit risk model employed, I note β for
Basel II by β∼ .
Thus, under Basel II regulation we have:  K Lβ∼≥ ⋅  (11)
Because foreign banks must calculate their capital requirement under the host country
regulation (Basel I) and under the home country regulation (Basel II), the level of loans
L given in country i is determined by:
min , ,max ( , )
f
i
f
hi h
i
Li
i
K LKL L K
β
πβ β
∼
∼
∼
 
− =   
(12)
where hβ
∼
 denotes the credit risk estimation of assets allocated in the home country
(Lh).
Combining equations (7) and (8), and assuming that home regulation is binding in
equation (12), I write the reaction function of bank f to the loans supplied by d as:20
( ) 2( , )
0 ( )
2 2
ff d f df
K f fif di i i
i i if
i
a r c cL L LL R L
L b
βπ
∼
∼
− − −∂
= ↔ = = −∂  (13)
20 I assume for simplicity that credit risk in the home country is 0 (
hβ
∼ = 0). A more interesting
case, in which the foreign bank invests in a variety of countries, is developed in the next section.
21 In this model I assume that the participation of foreign banks is as important to the host countries as
the participation of domestic banks. Empirical evidence shows that for some Latin American countries
(Argentina, Chile and Peru), the market share of foreign banks is around 50%. However, it might be inter-
esting for future research to analyze cases in which the participation of foreign banks is larger (or smaller)
than for local banks. For example, in Mexico the market share of foreign banks is more than 70%,
while in Brazil it is less than 30% and in Colombia less than 20%. In these cases, it might be
advantageous to develop a Stackelberg model instead of a Cournot model.
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As usual in a Cournot duopoly model, the quantity supplied by each bank is a
decreasing function of the loans determined by the other bank.21 Additionally, as the
credit risk estimation increases for a given country i, the quantity supplied by the foreign
bank decreases. This is not the case for a domestic bank that follows the current
regulation.22
From the intersection of the best response functions (equations (10) and (13)), I
determine the quantities supplied at equilibrium for this market to be:
4 2 2 ( ) ( )
3
d fd
d f i K d K fi
i
a c c r c r c
L
b
β β∼∼ − + − − + −
= (14)
4 2 2 ( ) ( )
3
f df
f d K f i K di
i
a c c r c r c
L
b
β β∼∼ − + − − + −
= (14’)
 These two equations yield our first results. Higher credit-risk estimation by a
foreign bank decreases its quantity supplied while on the other hand induces an increase
in the quantity of loans supplied by the domestic bank. However, the increase provided
by the domestic bank does not compensate the decrease from the foreign bank,
resulting in a decrease in total loans.
The idea behind this result is that credit risk estimation affects only the reaction
function of the foreign bank (see eq. (13)) and more precisely a higher estimation shifts
this best-response function downward, decreasing at the equilibrium the quantity supplied
by this bank. In contrast, the domestic bank’s reaction function is still the same and
does not compensate the reduction of the foreign bank because, as usual in a reaction
function, its slope is smaller than 45º. Indeed, the corner solutions for this function are
the cases in which the bank is 1) perfectly competitive, and 2) a monopoly (in which
case a lower quantity is supplied).23
The same finding is for the marginal cost of each bank and for the capital requirement
per unit loan of the domestic bank which it is constant across time.24
Note that a change in the level of loans supplied by the foreign bank due to a new
estimation of credit risk is given by:
( )2
3
ff
K fi
i
r cL
bβ
∼
∼
−∂
− =
∂
(14”)
This equation gives the macroeconomic implication of a change of credit risk
assessment by the foreign bank.
22 Additionally, as it is often assumed in the literature I suppose that a > 2c and that capital
remuneration is higher than marginal cost.
23 See Chapter 12 of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) for a detailed review of the
Cournot model.
24 Assuming that the asset allocation between the categories defined by Basel I (see annex 1) is
constant.
3. Sebastián Nieto.p65 19/05/05, 10:46 a.m.74
SEBASTIÁN NIETO PARRA 75
Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogotá (Colombia) 8 (1): 59-83, junio de 2005
• Portfolio diversification in N countries by the foreign bank
In this more realistic scenario, the profit function of the international bank is as
follows:
1 1
1 1
1
1
( , ) ( ) ( )
(2 ) (2 )
j i
f N N
f d f f f f f f
L j j L i i K j K ij i
j j
N
f f
f j f ij i
j
L L r L L r L L r L r L
c L c L
π β β
β β
− −
∼ ∼ ∼
= =
−
∼ ∼
=
= + − −
 
− − − −  
∑ ∑
∑ (15)
where j≠ i, and noting that the total amount of loans provided by bank f is fL , I have:
1
1
N
f f f
j i
j
L L L
−
=
= −∑ (16)
Assuming that the inverse demand function for loans and the credit risk measurement
are the same in all countries j ≠ i, I can rewrite (15) as follows:
( , ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
(2 )( ) (2 )
j
f
f d f f f d f f f f
L j i i i i K ij
f f f f f
K i i f i f ij i
L L r L L L a b L L L r L L
r L c L L c L
π β
β β β
∼ ∼
∼ ∼ ∼
 = − + − + − − 
− − − − − −
(17)
Again, in order to determine the optimal amount of loans given by the international
bank, I calculate the first order conditions thus:
( ) ( )( )( , ) 0 ( )
2 2
j
ff d f df
L j K fi jf di i i
i i if
i
a r L r cL L LL R L
L b
β βπ
∼ ∼
∼ − − − −∂
= ↔ = = −
∂ (18)
Comparing this expression with the case of investment in only one emerging country
(see equation (19)), the quantity supplied in country i depends also on the inverse
demand for loans and on credit risk measurement in countries other than i.
Obviously, the domestic bank reaction function is still the same as in the case of
investment in only one emerging country, so that, from equations (10) and (18), I deter-
mine the quantities supplied at equilibrium thus:
4 ( ) 2 ( ) ( )( )
3
i
d fd
d L j i K d K fi j
i
a c r L r c r c
L
b
β β β∼ ∼∼ − + − − + − −
= (19)
2 2 ( ) 2( )( ) ( )
3
j
f df
d L j K f i K di j
i
a c r L r c r c
L
b
β β β∼ ∼∼ + − − − − + −
= (19’)
In addition to the findings noted by equations (14) and (14’),25  there are two
corollaries. First, as inverse demand for loans increases in countries other than i, the
25 In particular, note that the change in portfolio composition of the foreign bank due to a new
estimation of credit risk given by equation (14”) is still in the same magnitude.
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total amount of loans given in country i decreases. Second, the quantity supplied in
country i increases as the credit risk measurement in other countries also increases.
This fact implies that, by the conduct of capital regulation, an assessment of credit risk
made by an international bank f in a given country not only affects the quantity supplied
in that country but also the total of loans made in other countries in which this bank has
a presence. These two results are found because domestic banks do not totally offset
the variation caused by international banks in the domestic loan market.
5.2. Risk-Averse Banks
• No information about countries
I start with the case in which the foreign bank makes a poor estimation of credit risk
in all countries and does not spend resources to learn more about a specific country.
Then, capital requirement per unit loans under Basel II is identically and independently
distributed with mean ρ and variance σ2. I note that:
( ) ( )i jE Eβ β ρ
∼ ∼
= = (20)
2( ) ( )i jV Vβ β σ
∼ ∼
= = (21)
By the same token, because there is no information about countries, inverse demand
for loans is also supposed to be the same across countries. Thus, the optimal amount of
assets to be invested in each country must be the same:
f
f
i
LL
N
= (22)
By using eq. (15), the expected profit is:
1 1 1
( ) ( ) (2 )
i
N N N
f f f f f
L i i K i f ii i
i i i
E E r L L r L c Lπ β β
∼
∼ ∼
= = =
 
= − − −  ∑ ∑ ∑ (23)
Taking into account the assumptions presented above, the expected profit becomes:
( ) (2 )f f f f fL K fE r L r L c Lπ ρ ρ
∼
= ⋅ − − ⋅ − (24)
and the variance of profits is:
2
2 2( ) ( )
f
f f
f K
LV c r
N
π σ
∼
= − (25)
We note the benefits of diversifying the portfolio for the foreign bank. In fact, as N
increases, the variance of the return decreases, while the expected profit is independent
of N (eq.(24)).26
26 Because in this model, I assume that credit risk estimation is independently distributed,
cov( , ) 0i jβ β =% % . In reality, because of contagion between emerging markets (due to current account
links or to similar macroeconomic conditions) this covariance must be positive, decreasing the
benefits of diversification.
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• Rumor in country i
The main purpose of this sub-section is to show that, given diversification, risk-
averse banks would have no incentive to use an accurate risk measurement for these
markets, something it can contribute, by the conduct of banking capital regulation,
toward a major procyclical effect in an emerging economy. As in Calvo (1998),27  I now
consider the case in which there is a rumor or “news” in country i. This rumor gives a
new mean value γ different from ρ for the capital requirement per unit of loans. Then,
for country i and countries j different than i, the expected capital requirements per
loans are respectively:
( )iE β γ
∼
=  (26)  and ( )jE β ρ
∼
= (27)
However the variance of credit risk estimation is still equal to σ2 as in other countries
and its distribution is independent.
By using equation (23), the expected profit for bank f is:
( ) ( ) (2 ) ( ) (2 )
j i
f f f f f f
L j K f i L i K f iE r L r c L L r L r c Lπ ρ ρ γ γ
∼     = − − − ⋅ − + − − − ⋅     (28)
And because the expected value and variance of credit risk estimation are identical
in countries other than i, and additionally since I am assuming that countries other than
i have the same inverse demand for loans, I obtain the result that the allocation invested
in these countries must be constant across them:
1
f f
f i
j
L LL
N
−
=
−
(29)
Moreover, the variance of the total portfolio of the foreign bank is then:
2
2 2 2( )( ) ( )
1
f f
f f fi
f K i
L LV c r L
N
π σ
∼  −
= − ⋅ + 
−  (30)
Again, as N increases the volatility of the foreign bank’s portfolio diminishes, while
the expected profit is independent of N.
Assuming that the Von Neumann-Morgensten utility U is a quadratic function where
α  is the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA), the expected utility can be
represented from a mean–variance criterion (equations (28) and (30)) as follows:
( ) ( )
2
f fEU E Vαπ π
∼ ∼
= − (31)
27 Calvo (1998) shows that the cause of a balance of payments crisis can be explained by lenders’
behavior. In fact, even if both diversification and information are desirable features for an investor,
there may be a significant trade-off between them, which can provoke a balance of payment crises.
Calvo (1998) has shown two important facts. First, investment into or away from a given country can
be highly sensitive to news in a world in which investors are highly diversified. Second, highly diversified
investors have lower incentives to learn about individual countries than investors with few diversifica-
tion opportunities. These characteristics of highly-diversified investors tell us that diversification can
encourage ignorance and, in that context, rumors can result in massive capital flows from the perspec-
tive of an individual country.
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As before, in order to determine the optimal amount of loans given by the international
bank, I calculate the first order conditions (from eq. (31)) thus:
2 2
2 2
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1( )
2 ( )
1
j
f f f d
L j K f f K i
f f d
i i i
f
f K
a r L r c c r L bL
NL R L Nb c r
N
αγ ρ σ
ασ
− − − − + − −
−
= =
+ −
−
(32)
Note that in addition to the variables found for the reaction function of risk-neutral
banks, this depends also on the risk-aversion coefficient α, on the number of countries
N, and on the variance of credit risk assessment σ2.
Noteworthy, the domestic bank reaction function is still the same as before. From
equations (10) and (32), I determine the quantities supplied at equilibrium:
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
( ) 4 2 ( )
( 2 ) 1
2 2 3 2 ( )
1
2( 2 ( ) 2 ) 2( )( ) ( )
1
2 3 2 ( )
1
j
d f
i K d f K
d d
i
f
f K
f f f
L j d K f f K
f
f K
Nr c b c r
a c NL
Nb b b c r
N
a r L c b r c b b c r L
N
Nb b c r
N
β ασ
ασ
αγ ρ σ
ασ
 
− + − 
−
− 
= −  
+ − 
− 
− − + + − − − −
−
 
+ − 
− 
(33)
2 2
2 2
22 ( ) 2 2( )( ) ( ) ( )
1
3 2 ( )
1
j
f f f d
L j d K f f K i K d
f
i
f
f K
a r L c r c c r L r c
NL Nb c r
N
αγ ρ σ β
ασ
− + − − − + − + −
−
=
+ −
−
(33’)
In addition to the variables obtained for the case of risk-neutral banks, I find that the
total level of loans in country i depends also on the risk aversion of the bank, α, on the
accuracy of the assessment of credit risk, σ2, and on the number of countries in which
the bank f is investing, N. In particular, I find that an increase (decrease) in the expected
risk estimation for country i (for countries j) decreases the total level of domestic loans
in country i due to the fact that the variation of the loans given by the foreign bank are
offset only by half by the domestic bank (as it was for the case of risk-neutral banks).
A more interesting result is the change in the portfolio composition of the foreign
bank due to a new estimation of credit risk. This is computed as the derivative of the
level of loans in country i with respect to the expected capital requirement per loan γ in
equation (33’), i.e.,
2 2 2 2
( 1)2( ) 2( )
( 1)3 2 ( ) 3 2 ( )
f ff
K f K fi
Nf f
f K f K
N r c r cL
N b N c r b c rγ ασ ασ→+∞
− − −∂
− = →∂ − + − + − (34)
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Note that as N increases, the impact of a new credit risk estimation on the amount of
loans given by the foreign bank in country i is higher.28  Therefore, by making N
sufficiently large, the change in the amount of loans allocated to country i by bank f as
a proportion of the original investment (from eq. (22), prior to new information,
investment in country i was L/N) could be arbitrarily large following new information.
Thus, I obtain the same conclusion as Calvo (1998): “As the opportunities of
diversification increase, the impact of “news” on the allocation of investment funds
(relative to initial allocation) grows without bound”.
There are two additional findings. First, from a macroeconomic point of view, as
portfolio diversification increases, the total level of loans in a given country can be harshly
affected by the behavior of a foreign bank following “news” and obeying the new capital
regulation. Indeed, domestic banks do not compensate the variation of international bank
loans: thus new banking capital regulation and “rumors” can greatly diminish the total
level of domestic loans, and consequently investment and economic growth.
Second, analyzing banking behavior, by comparing equations (14”) and (34), I obtain
that the change in portfolio composition following a new credit-risk estimation in a
given country is smaller for risk-averse banks than for risk-neutral banks, since the
risk-aversion coefficient, α, and the lack of accuracy of credit risk assessment in other
countries, σ2, are higher. Consequently, even in the case in which portfolio diversification
increases harshly, the macroeconomic implication of a change in credit risk estimation,
via the new banking regulation, is greater when banks are risk-neutral.
6. Conclusions
In this article I first considered the main aspects discussed in the theoretical literature
on bank capital regulation. In particular, we noted that the research already undertaken
has produced some useful insights into the design of capital standards. Because of
banks’ informational advantage, incentive compatibility calls for a scheme of regulation
that encompasses a menu of different instruments. Another development in research
related to capital standards is the implementation of the optimal governance of banks,
to define the threshold for interference in management and for transfer of control from
shareholders to the depositor’s representative, the supervisory authority.
However, as noted by Santos (2000), there are still many relevant questions that
remain unanswered. For example, theoretical research on the macroeconomic
implications of bank capital regulation is still very scarce (Blum and Hellwig (1995),
Thakor (1996), and Krainer (2002)).
28 More precisely we have that: 
( )3 22
22 2
4
0
( 1)3 2 ( )
ff
k fi
f
f k
r cL
N N b N c r
ασ
γ ασ
−∂
− = >
∂ ∂  
− + −  .
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Concerning the procyclicality of the financial system, an important source of the
amplification by the financial system of swings in the macro-economy is the inappropriate
measurement of changes in the absolute level of risk over time by financial market
participants, especially in its systematic component. This miscalculation arises from the
short horizons that underlie most risk measurement methodologies and from insufficient
attention being paid to the correlations across borrowers and institutions. The consequence
of this is that risk is often underestimated in booms and overestimated in recessions.
The credit risk structure of the 1988 Capital Accord does not have a strong cyclical
component. Indeed, capital requirements change over time only if the strategy of a
bank’s asset portfolio changes. By contrast, the New Basel Capital Accord implies that
the capital requirement for a given portfolio will change over time as the bank’s
assessment of the riskiness of that portfolio changes. If measured risk falls in booms
and increases in recessions, then this would have implications for the procyclicality of
the financial system. Financial stability would be enhanced by provisions and capital
ratios increasing in economic booms.
The model developed in this article uses an adaptation of the Monti-Klein model to
the banking capital regulation. In order to determine equilibrium in the loan market
(which is composed of foreign and domestic banks), I took on the assumption first that
banks are risk-neutral and second that they are risk-averse. From a theoretical point of
view, this model is useful for two reasons. First, it analyzes a duopoly model for risk-
averse banks and second, it is an additional contribution to the research on the relationship
between banking capital regulation and the business cycle. In particular, I determined
the impact that an international bank might have on an emerging economy (through the
loan market) when adopting Basel II, and assuming that the Accord is binding for this
bank.29  The main results are:
1.  A higher credit risk estimation by a foreign bank decreases its quantity supplied,
and on the other hand increases the quantity supplied by the domestic bank.
However, the increase in the credits by the domestic bank does not offset the
decrease by the foreign bank, resulting in a decrease of the total loans. This is
because, while the best-response function of the foreign bank shifts downward, the
domestic bank’s reaction function is still the same and its slope is smaller than 45º.
Indeed, the corner solutions for this function are the cases in which the bank is 1)
perfectly competitive, and 2) a monopoly (in which case a lower quantity is supplied).
2. The total quantity supplied in a given country increases as the credit risk estimation
for other countries also increases. This implies that, by the conduct of the new
banking capital regulation, the assessment realized by an international bank in a
29 I assume that Basel II regulation is binding for the bank with respect to its strategy and host
country banking regulation (Basel I).
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given country not only affects the quantity supplied in that country but also the
total loans in other countries where the bank has a presence.
3. Analyzing risk-averse banks, I obtained the same results presented above. Ad-
ditionally, I showed that, as diversification increases, the change in loans allo-
cated in a given country by an international bank as a proportion of the original
investment and the total level of loans (and consequently investment and eco-
nomic growth) in a given country could be harshly affected by the behavior of
a foreign bank following new information and employing the new banking capital
regulation.
4. Even in the case where the opportunities for diversification increase harshly, the
change in portfolio composition following a new credit risk estimation in a given
country is smaller for risk-averse banks than for risk neutral banks, as risk aversion
and the lack of accuracy in credit risk assessment are higher. Therefore, the
macroeconomic implication of a change in credit risk estimation, via the new
banking regulation, is greater when banks are risk-neutral than when they are risk-
averse.
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Appendix 1 Basel capital accord 1988 (Basel I)
This annex presents an overview of the current solvency ratio. This ratio must be
equal to or higher than 8% and can be written as follows:
4
1
1 2 8%
i i
i
Tier TierSR
RW Assets
=
+
= ≥
⋅∑
where:
- Tier 1 is defined as common stock, retained earnings, and perpetual preferred
stock. It must correspond at least at 50% of the whole capital.
- Tier 2 is defined as fixed maturity preferred stock, loan loss reserves, and
subordinated debt.
RW stands for the Risk Weight. There is a RW for each category:
1. In category 1, the RW is 0% and corresponds to risk-free assets (e.g., cash, reser-
ves, and government securities).
2. In category 2, the RW is 20% and corresponds to slightly more risky assets (e.g.,
interbank deposits, fully backed mortgage bonds, general obligations of state and
local governments, and securities issued by government agencies).
3. In category 3, the RW is 50% and corresponds to yet riskier assets (e.g., revenue
bonds of state and local governments and residential mortgages).
4. In category 4, the RW is 100% and corresponds to the riskiest assets (e.g.,
commercial paper, business and household loans, and various fixed assets).
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